Cases

Typical questions. Public authorities.

Illustrative of the issues. Not a list of appointments. Current and former employers appear in some of the public files.

Typical questions

  • FX barriers

    Chasing a one-touch

    A one-touch digital that paid after a large print in a thin market. Whether that print was a good barrier under the confirmation — source, cut, continuous observation — and whether the tape was a market or a chase.

  • FX barriers

    Knock-out of a reverse knock-out

    Whether a print in the observation window was a good barrier under the confirmation: source, cut, continuous or discrete, and what a dealer who had run those books would have treated as a print.

  • FX barriers

    Windowed and American barriers

    A barrier live only in a window, or live continuously. Gap risk over a weekend or a data release, and whether a print outside the window was nevertheless treated as a knock.

  • FX barriers

    Pin risk into a barrier

    Delta-hedging into a barrier as spot pinned. Whether the hedge was managing a genuine knock risk, or a pattern of prints intended to force the barrier.

  • Options

    TARF, accrual and target-redemption structures

    A target-redemption or accrual forward sold as a hedge. What the payoff actually was, how it accrued, and whether early termination was the market value of the remaining accruals.

  • Options

    Vanilla close-out off the wrong surface

    A book of vanillas marked to a volatility surface that was not the surface of that day, that size or that delta. What a dealing room would have used to replace the trades.

  • Market abuse

    From detection to closure

    What happened between a suspicious pattern firing and the alert being closed. Whether anyone reconstructed the orders, or closed the story the platform told.

  • Market abuse

    Independent review of a surveillance closure

    A bank’s compliance team has closed an alert. The business wants an independent view from the actual orders and trades — not from the compliance write-up. Whether the activity is consistent with legitimate market behaviour or may indicate abuse.

  • Market abuse

    Spoofing, layering and wash trading

    Orders placed and cancelled in a pattern that may have been intended to move a thin FX price. Read from the order book, not from the alert text: size, life of the order, and whether a genuine strategy explains it.

  • Market abuse

    Ramping a thin print

    A cluster of aggressive prints into a quiet book, a fixing window or a barrier. Whether the tape is a genuine interest in that size, or an attempt to force a price through a level.

  • Market abuse

    STOR or market observation

    Whether the pattern met the threshold for a suspicious-transaction report or a market observation to the FCA. The evidence in the FX tape, not the narrative in the alert.

  • Market abuse

    WM/R 4pm and other benchmark windows

    Orders clustered in a WMR, ECB or EM fixing window. Methodology of the benchmark, the client instruction, and whether the tape is a genuine fixing or an attempt to move the print.

  • Spot FX

    Last look on a spot order

    Whether a rejection inside the last-look window was consistent with price-and-credit checking, or with holding the order long enough to trade against it.

  • Spot FX

    Internalisation of a client order

    Whether the desk filled from its own book at a genuine market, or used the order as a source of last-look flow. What a client of that standing would have been shown.

  • Spot FX

    Stop-loss in a gap

    A stop triggered through a gap after a data print or a weekend open. Whether the fill was the first available market, or a price taken from the far side of a book that had already been positioned.

  • Forwards

    Broken-date forward points

    A close-out on a date that is not a standard tenor. Interpolation of the curve, the points a dealer would have shown, and whether the quoted close was interpolation or a penalty.

  • Forwards

    Historic-rate rollover

    A corporate strip rolled at historic rates. Whether the points, the historic spot and the cash settlement were the market of the roll dates, or a structure that locked in a loss the client could not see.

Illustrative published cases

Public judgments, decisions and settlements in FX

Public decisions he can speak to. Not a list of appointments. These are the authorities a solicitor in this field already knows. They show the questions the practice is built to answer.

Vanilla and barrier options

  • United States v. Neil Phillips (Glen Point Capital / Morgan Stanley)

    155 F.4th 102 (2d Cir. 2025); 690 F. Supp. 3d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)

    A one-touch digital barrier option on USD/ZAR, barrier 12.50, sold by Morgan Stanley. Glen Point’s co-CIO convicted of directing some $700 million of spot to touch the barrier and collect a $20 million payout. The Second Circuit affirmed: what a one-touch is, whether the print was a good barrier, and whether chasing it was a market or a fraud.

  • CFTC v. Glen Point Capital Advisors LP

    No. 1:22-cv-10589 (S.D.N.Y., filed 15 December 2022)

    The civil companion. Two one-touch binary options on USD/ZAR, combined payout $30 million, alleged to have been chased on 25 and 28 December 2017 in thin holiday liquidity. What the confirmation required as a barrier event, whether the print was a market, and the 1LOD/2LOD question of how a dealer records a one-touch that has just paid.

  • Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings Inc

    [2013] EWHC 3463 (Comm)

    Close-out of an FX and currency-options book. Cooke J on the market meaning of a vanilla put or call, and whether knock-outs, double knock-outs, digitals and target-profit forwards were currency options or exotic transactions outside the trader’s authority. The same book: digital currency options, dual-range digitals, knock-out timing options and fade-in forwards.

  • Goldman Sachs International v Videocon Global Ltd

    [2013] EWHC 2843 (Comm); [2016] EWCA Civ 130

    Sums due on the termination of two vanilla currency option transactions (INR/USD and BRL/USD) under a 1992 ISDA. Whether the close-out followed the Master Agreement — quotes for spot, forwards and FX volatilities, and the options model used to turn them into a number.

  • KIKO knock-in knock-out currency options

    2011Da53683 (en banc), Supreme Court of Korea, 26 September 2013

    Knock-in knock-out USD/KRW options sold to Korean exporters. Whether the structure was an unfair contract, whether it was a hedge, and the bank’s duty to explain the knock-in, the knock-out and the unlimited downside.

  • Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc

    [2010] EWHC 211 (Comm)

    A ratio / accrual FX product with a protected rate and a barrier rate. Whether the bank advised, whether a duty of care arose, and whether the close-out of a structured FX trade with a barrier was a market.

Close-out and ISDA

  • Anthracite Rated Investments (Jersey) Ltd v Lehman Brothers Finance SA

    [2011] EWHC 1822 (Ch)

    Automatic early termination of cash-settled put options under ISDA after Lehman’s default. How the Early Termination Cash Settlement Amount is to be determined — a dealing-room close-out, not a screen mid.

  • Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson Inc

    [2012] EWCA Civ 419

    Section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement after an Event of Default. Whether payment obligations are suspended, and what a close-out under the 1992 and 2002 forms is meant to achieve.

  • Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc v National Power Corporation

    [2018] EWHC 487 (Comm)

    Close-out of a USD/PHP forward currency swap under the 2002 ISDA. Whether the non-defaulting party’s Close-out Amount had to be objectively commercially reasonable, and whether a later, larger calculation could replace the first.

  • Conway v Plass (Re Argentex LLP)

    [2025] EWHC 3125 (Ch)

    Administrators of an FX and payments firm sought to close out a book of forwards and options before maturity because the book was net positive. The court refused: the contracts were for certainty of a future price, not an early unwind for the firm’s own account.

Market conduct

  • Final Notices — Citibank, HSBC, JPMorgan, RBS and UBS

    12 November 2014

    G10 spot FX: ineffective controls allowed traders to share confidential client information and to attempt to manipulate WM/Reuters and ECB fixes, including in collusion. Fines totalling £1.1 billion.

  • Final Notice — Barclays Bank Plc

    19 May 2015

    The same G10 spot failings at Barclays’ London FX business: information sharing, attempted manipulation of fixes, and attempts to trigger client stop-loss orders. Fine of £284 million.

  • Barclays — Last Look on BARX

    18 November 2015

    Automated last look used to reject client orders that would have been unprofitable after a milliseconds-long hold. When clients asked why fills were rejected, the bank cited technical issues. Additional $150 million penalty.

  • United States v. Mark Johnson

    945 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 2019)

    HSBC’s global head of FX cash trading convicted of wire fraud over a $3.5 billion Cairn Energy sterling purchase. Pre-hedging and ramping into a fixing, and whether the client was told the truth about how the order would be worked.

  • United States v. Akshay Aiyer

    33 F.4th 97 (2d Cir. 2022)

    A JPMorgan CEEMEA FX trader convicted of conspiring to fix prices and rig bids in emerging-market currencies. Coordination of bids and offers, withholding of supply, and concealment over chatrooms and personal phones.

Competition

  • AT.40135 FOREX — Three Way Banana Split and Essex Express

    Decisions of 16 May 2019

    Article 101 infringements in G10 spot: multilateral private chatrooms, recurrent exchange of commercially sensitive information, and occasional coordination of trading, including around WMR and ECB fixes.

  • Michael O’Higgins FX Class Representative Ltd v Barclays Bank plc

    [2022] CAT 16; [2023] EWCA Civ 876; [2025] UKSC 48

    Follow-on collective proceedings from the Commission’s FOREX decisions. The Supreme Court, on 18 December 2025, restored the CAT’s refusal to certify on an opt-out basis.